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This thesis aimed to explain the differences between the substitutional and
the referential quantifier. It did so firstly by presenting an analysis of the dis-
cussion between Wallace and Kripke, secondly by analysing Tarski’s reasons
for introducing satisfaction, and finally by looking at whether Kripke’s def-
inition manages to avoid the issues that motivated Tarski. It concluded that
an essential part of the recursive truth-definition given by Kripke is the as-
sumption of a pre-given truth-definition for an atomic language. However, if
this atomic language is of infinite size, satisfaction is needed to provide this
definition. Rather than a differing in whether they use of satisfaction, this
thesis argues that the substitutional and the referential quantifiers differ in
where in the definition of truth they make the connection between truth and
the world.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Traditionally, quantification is seen as a function ranging over objects, called
referential quantification. Informally, according to this interpretation, an ex-
istential quantifier (∃xi)P(xi) is true if and only if there is an object that
has the quality P which satisfies the sentential function P(xi). For exam-
ple, ’There is something that is white’ is true if there is an object such as
snow, which is white. Similarly, with the universal quantifier, a statement
(∀xi)P(xi) is true if every object has the quality P. However, this is not the
only interpretation of the quantifiers. An alternative is substitutional quan-
tification, in which quantification is not seen as ranging over objects, but over
terms of a language. According to this interpretation, an existential statement
of the form (∃xi)P(xi) is true if and only if there is a true sentence of the form
P(o) where object o is a part of the substitution class of the language. As
an example, ’There is something that is white’ would be considered true if
there is a term such as ’snow’ and the sentence ’snow is white’ is true. The
substitutional quantifier, by not quantifying over objects but over phrases, is
said to avoid Quinean ontological commitment and thus to be ontologically
lighter. On the other hand, it is argued that by not ranging over objects the
substitutional quantifier does not maintain the connection between language
and the world.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Wallace ("Frame of Reference"; "Convention T") and Tharp argued for ref-
erential quantification in a few influential papers. They write that the claimed
benefits of substitutional quantification are not actually present because one
cannot give a correct truth-definition for a substitutional quantifier without
covert appeal to a notion of satisfaction. Instead, satisfaction can be found in
these definitions, even if it is not immediately obvious. Because of this, both
theories have the same ontological commitments.
As a response to this, Saul Kripke published "Is There a Problem about
Substitutional Quantification". Kripke argues that there is no problem at all
with giving a truth-definition of a substitutional language that does not make
use of satisfaction. He shows that both interpretations can have correct truth-
definitions and that they are, properly speaking, two independent concepts.
The quantifiers can even be combined or used in the same language. Kripke
argues that the choice of which quantifier to use depends on the system in
which we use it, and that in many instances the choice of quantifier is unim-
portant. This paper virtually ended the discussion on substitutional and ref-
erential quantification.
While the discussion has ended, this does not mean that all questions sur-
rounding referential and substitutional quantification have been answered.
While Kripke has convincingly argued that both quantifiers can be given a
definition, this does not explain wherein exactly the difference between the
two lies, nor where the difference originates from. This thesis will attempt to
answer what the differences between substitutional and referential quantifi-
cation are and what causes these differences.
It will do this by providing an overview of the discussion so far, by first
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of all giving an account of Wallace’s argument that the substitutional quanti-
fier needs to make use of satisfaction, and secondly by giving an account of
the arguments made by Kripke in "Is There a Problem about Substitutional
Quantification". After this, in the second part of this thesis, an analysis will
be given of the reason for and the importance of satisfaction, and the ques-
tion whether terms must denote.
This thesis will argue that proper analysis shows that satisfaction cannot
be avoided for a significant class of substitutional languages, namely those
with an infinite amount of atomic sentences, and that the difference between
the two quantifiers instead lies in at which point of the construction of the
language the connection between language and the world is made. Further-
more, it will argue that many of the points raised as the philosophical signif-
icance of satisfaction are instead already present in the notions of ‘language’
and ‘truth’.

5Chapter 2
Wallace, Satisfaction and
Substitutional Quantification
As stated in the introduction, one of the main opponents of the idea that
substitutional quantification provides a reasonable alternative to referential
quantification is John Wallace. Wallace argues that for a truth definition of a
substitutional language to fulfil the requirements of a truth definition, axioms
need to be added beyond a formalisation of the definition of substitutional
quantification. However, he argues, these axioms would introduce a notion
of satisfaction to the substitutional language and thus eradicate any relevant
differences between the two quantifiers. This chapter will analyse the argu-
ment put forward by Wallace by first looking at the goals and aims that he
sets for a theory of truth, and his justifications for this. Then, it will look at his
definitions of the referential and the substitutional quantifier. Thirdly, it will
look at the problems that Wallace argues the substitutional quantifier has,
and finally it will look at the relation between the new axioms and satisfac-
tion. As a whole, this chapter aims to give a comprehensive overview of the
argument put forward by Wallace, rather than critically assess the arguments
themselves, which will take place in later chapters.
6 Chapter 2. Wallace, Satisfaction and Substitutional Quantification
2.1 Conditions of Truth-Theories
Before we can discuss different theories of truth, it is first necessary to dis-
cuss what we view as successful theories of truth, and what conditions we
impose on these theories. For Wallace, these conditions are largely deter-
mined by Tarski. Wallace, on the basis of the works of Tarski, places four
requirements on any theory of truth.
First of all, the concept of truth has to be relative to a language. Truth is
taken to be a predicate of sentences, which in turn are a specific combina-
tion of symbols. It is very possible, likely even, that a specific combination of
symbols has different meanings in different languages, and that because of
this different truth-values are ascribed to it for different languages.
Secondly, a language cannot contain its own truth predicate. This is done
to avoid situations like the Liar’s paradox, where for a sentence like ‘This
sentence is false’ we would need to construct a partial definition of truth
that states that ‘This sentence is true if and only if this sentence is false’,
which would result in a paradox. Because of this, we have to make use
both of an object language, which is the language for which we aim to give
a truth-definition, and a metalanguage, in which we intend to give the truth-
definition of the object language.
Thirdly, only complete sentences of a language can be true or false. In
cases in which the sentence is not closed and still contains open variables, it
cannot be given a truth-value and must remain undetermined.
Finally, Wallace argues that any definition of truth has to fulfil Tarski’s
convention T, which states that for any sentence such as ‘snow is white’, we
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are able to construct a sentence of the form:
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
where the first half of the biconditional is the sentence for which we are defin-
ing truth, and the second half is a translation of this sentence into the lan-
guage in which we are defining truth. Wallace writes that
Tarski’s next point concerns the role of partial definitions of truth, i.e., sen-
tences of the form of ‘Lizzy is playful’ is true if and only if Lizzy is playful, in
setting adequacy conditions for a theory of truth. Roughly, an adequate the-
ory of truth for a given object language must explain each partial definition
of truth. ("Frame of Reference", 120)
Taken together, these four conditions place several limitations on the meta-
language. It needs to have sufficient expressive power to be able to both
name and translate every sentence of the object language. It also needs to
include a notion of logical consequence, as logical consequence is necessary
to form the sentences of convention T. Furthermore, it needs to include every
sentence of the form ‘T(p) if and only if p’, where p is the canonical name of a
sentence of the object language and p is its translation (Wallace, "Convention
T" 201).
The notion of translation has not been explained. Wallace avoids the ques-
tion in the following way:
What is a good or correct translation between two languages is of course a
difficult question on which there is little substantive agreement and less hard
theory. In the case of truth theories taken up in this paper the general problem
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of translation is bypassed in two ways: (1) we shall usually be interested in
cases where the object language is included in the metalanguage, e.g., ML =
OL + a bit of recursive apparatus; in these cases we study the identity trans-
lation, which seems clearly to be a good one; (2) the main results of the paper
extend to large classes of translations, but these classes can be characterized
in terms of abstract structural features of translations, e.g., translation such
that every sentence in a certain class of metalanguage sentences is a transla-
tion of something. ("Frame of Reference", 122-123)
Wallace argues that even without properly defining translation we can look
at theories of truth by letting the example definition be given in a metalan-
guage that includes the object language itself. If the object language is in-
cluded, translation becomes trivial. This result can then afterwards be ex-
tended to other types of translation.
Wallace further states the condition that a theory of truth should be finitely
axiomized. He gives several reason for this. In Convention T and Substitutional
Quantification he states that this condition is necessary to avoid trivial defini-
tions of truth.
As described so far, Convention T would be satisfied by a theory that took all
target conditionals as axioms. To guard against this trivialization one may
want to add the condition that an adequate theory of truth be finitely axiom-
atized. (201)
In "On the Frame of Reference" he further justifies why trivial theories of
truth should be rejected.
We want a theory of truth to be analytic or recursive, picking out a finite
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number of compoundable features of sentences whose effect on truth condi-
tions are uniform. On the other hand, we want not to say in advance what
the compoundable features and their effects are. A recursion we want; the
shape or strategy of the recursion we want to leave open. The demand for
a finite theory seems a – perhaps crude – way of satisfying both desires. To
demand only that the theory be recursively axiomatizable is too weak: the set
of partial definitions is itself recursive. But obviously no analysis is achieved
by a theory that takes all “target” biconditionals as axioms. (122)
If a trivial theory of truth can be given simply by taking all the target bicon-
ditionals, Wallace argues, this would not reveal any structure to truth, and it
would not teach us anything about the nature of truth.
2.2 Satisfaction Definition of Truth
The theory of truth of which Wallace himself is a proponent defines truth via
a notion of satisfaction. This approach defines a set of atomic sentential func-
tions, which are similar to sentences, with the exception that they contain
open variables. For example, we could have the sentential function
x is white.
These atomic sentential functions can be used to build more complex senten-
tial functions through conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification.
We can define a satisfaction-predicate for sentential functions by stating
for each atomic sentential function what kind of objects would satisfy it. To
come back to the previous example, ‘x is white’ would be satisfied by all
white things. Satisfaction can then be recursively defined for all sentential
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functions by saying that a negation of a sentential function is satisfied by a
sequence if and only if the sentential function is not, a conjunction is satis-
fied if both parts are satisfied, and an existential quantification is satisfied by
a sequence if a sequence that differs at most in the relevant term would sat-
isfy the sentence. Sentences are defined as those sentential functions without
open variables. The truth of a sentence is defined on the basis of satisfaction.
Wallace takes a similar approach to this informal definition of satisfaction
("Frame of Reference", 125) Languages defined this way are called referential
languages, and the quantifiers used is called the referential quantifier.
Wallace formalises this definition for a metalanguage which not only in-
cludes the predicates and the logical apparatus of the object language, but
also arithmetic, a syntactical apparatus for structural-descriptive names, a
two-place predicate ‘Sat’, a one-place predicate ‘Seq’ and a two-place func-
tion sign ‘Val’. ("Frame of Reference", 125) The two-place predicate ‘Sat’
refers to the satisfaction of a sentential function by a sequence s. The one-
place predicate ‘Seq’ says of an object that it is a sequence. As for ‘Val’, Val(s,
n) refers to the nth member of a sequence s.
Furthermore, Wallace uses the expression ‘s ≈n s′’ as an abbreviation for
‘(m)(m 6= n ⇒ Val(s, m) = Val(s′, m))’, which says of a sequence s that it
differs from s′ in at most the nth place. After this, he defines formally satis-
faction as
(1’) s Sat neg(f) ⇐⇒ ¬ (s Sat f)
(2’) s Sat conj(f, g) ⇐⇒ (s Sat f & s Sat g)
2.2. Satisfaction Definition of Truth 11
(3’) s Sat exquant (f, xn) ⇐⇒ (Es’)(s ≈ s’ & s’ Sat f)
(4’) s Sat pred (be f ore, xm, xn) ⇐⇒ Val(s, m) is before Val(s, n) ("Frame
of Reference", 125)
To round off the theory of truth, it is necessary to have two further axioms.
First of all there needs to be an axiom that ensures that there are sequences.
(5’) (∃x)(Seq x) ("Frame of Reference", 125)
Secondly, sequences need to be able to vary freely over a certain range.
(6’) (∃s’)(s ≈ s’ & Val(s’, n) = x) ("Frame of Reference", 126)
Wallace states that with these axioms for a sentence Fx1...xnwith only those
x1, . . . xn variables free and a sentence ‘F Val(s, k1)...Val(s, kn)’ that is the
result of replacing all those variables with a term from the sequence, we can
prove every sentence of the form:
(A) s Sat Fx1...xn ⇐⇒ F Val(s, k1) ... Val(s, kn) ("Frame of Reference",
126)
This shows that satisfaction is closely related to the truth of the sentences that
are a result of replacing the variables in a sentential functions with terms.
Wallace writes:
‘The present theory gives ‘s Sat f’ the intuitive sense: f comes out true when the
reference of each of its free variables is fixed to be the value of that variable under s.
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("Frame of Reference", 126)
As outlined at the start of this chapter, the truth of a sentence is defined on
the basis of satisfaction, in that a sentence is considered true if and only if all
sequences satisfy it, and false if and only if no sequences satisfy it.
Evidently, whether a sequence satisfies a sentence depends only on what the se-
quence assigns to numbers corresponding to variables free in the sentence. If the
sentence is closed, whether it is satisfied by a sequence does not depend at all on
what the members of the sequence are. A closed sentence is true if it is satisfied by
every sequence, and false otherwise.’ ("Frame of Reference", 126)
While this alone is sufficient to express a complete recursive theory of truth
on the basis of satisfaction, Wallace adds two further axioms.
Hilbert and Bernays have observed that every first-order language with
a finite primitive vocabulary of predicates contains an open sentence ’Rxy’
with two free variables such that
(x)Rxx
and all sentences of the form
(x)(y)(Rxy⇒ (Fx ⇐⇒ Fy)) (Hilbert & Bernays, pp. 381ff, via Wallace,
"Frame of Reference", 126)
where we can take Rxy to mean that x and y are indistinguishable relative to
the ontology of the language. Wallace takes ‘Eq’ as the structural-descriptive
name of this predicate, which is assumed to range over the first two variables
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of the language, and ‘Eq′’ as the result of identifying the variables in Eq. He
then formalises the results of Hilbert and Bernays as
(C) s Sat Eq′ ("Frame of Reference", 127)
and from the existence of Eq proves
(D) <x, y> Sat Eq⇒ (<...x...> Sat f ⇐⇒ <...y...> Sat f) (Wallace, "Frame
of Reference", 127)
This states that if two objects are indistinguishable by a language, a sequence
containing the one will satisfy a sentential function of the language if and
only if a sequence containing the other in its place would do so as well.
Wallace defines the totally of his theory of truth on the basis of satisfac-
tion as follows:
Five formulas now sum up the effects of a satisfactional truth theory that
produces the homophonic partial definitions of truth.
(I) True(F) ⇐⇒ F
(II) (x)(True(x) ⇐⇒ x is a closed sentence & (s)(Seq s⇒ s Sat x))
(III) s Sat Fx1...xn ⇐⇒ F Val(s, k1) ... Val(s, kn)
(IV) s Sat Eq′
(V) <x, y> Sat Eq⇒ (<...x...> Sat f ⇐⇒ <...y...> Sat f) ("Frame of Ref-
erence", 127)
These five formulae express the result of the theory of truth defined through
satisfaction that Wallace puts forward. It includes all partial definitions of
truth, states that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by every sequence, that
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if a sequence s satisfies F, the result of replacing the variables of F with the
terms of the s will result in a true sentence, and that two objects that are
indistinguishable satisfy the same things.
2.3 Substitutional Theory of Truth
We have seen that the referential theory of truth functions through the defi-
nition of a satisfaction relation, which says of a predicate what objects would
make it true. A substitutional theory of truth, on the other hand, does not
define truth via a recursive definition of satisfaction, but aims to give a direct
recursive definition of truth. Instead of using a universe of objects to quan-
tify over, quantification in this theory happens via substitution. This means
that rather than looking at whether an object satisfies the sentential function,
we simply take an existentially quantified sentence such as ‘(∃x) x is white’ to
be true if there is a sentence that is the result of replacing the variable with a
term of a specifically-defined substitution class of the language and this sen-
tence is true, such as ‘snow is white’.
Wallace gives three different formalisations of this notion, namely the
Naive substitution interpretation, the Hilbert-Bernays substitution interpre-
tation and the McKinsey substitution interpretation ("Frame of Reference").
The Naive interpretation will be focussed on here, as the other two are mostly
variants of the first.
The recursion of the Naive substitution interpretation of quantification
languages can be given as follows: a negation is true if and only if what is
being negated is not true, a conjunction is true if and only if both of the con-
juncts are true, and an existential quantification (∃xn)(Fxn) is true if and only
if some substitution instance of Fxn is true. Wallace expresses this recursion
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as follows:
[7] True (neg(f)) ⇐⇒ ¬ True(f)
[8] True (conj (f, g)) ⇐⇒ (True(f) & True(g))
[9] True (exquant (f, vn) ⇐⇒ (∃a)(S-class(a) & True (sub (a, vn, f))).
("Frame of Reference", 128)
Here, ‘sub (a, vn, f)’ stands for the substitution of all free occurrences of vn
in f with a. These three definitions do not provide a recursive definition, as
there are no base cases: no use is made of atomic predicates. To give a full
definition, it is necessary to give the truth for a set of atomic sentences.
2.4 Consequences of Satisfaction
While the question of how we should categorise truth seems like a natural
one, in that it is an often-used term and we might want to know when it ap-
plies and how we should use it, this is not Wallace’s core intention for his
paper. For Wallace, the question whether truth has to be defined via satis-
faction is not just a technical detail of the construction of a successful truth-
definition, but itself tells us something about the notion of true: if it were to
be successfully shown whether truth has to be defined via satisfaction or not,
this teaches us something meaningful and concrete about truth. He writes
that:
From a semantical point of view, quantification, ontology, predication and
extensionality form a single structure. The semantical interpretation of pred-
ication is that predicates are satisfied by object, independently of how objects
are described; satisfiers of quantified sentences are determined by satisfiers of
their predicate parts, relative to a universe of discourse. This semantical point
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of view is Tarski’s; the referential structure it brings to light is exactly repre-
sented in Tarski’s theory of truth for quantificational languages. ("Frame of
Reference", 117)
He argues that a definition of truth that occurs via satisfaction is one that
shows that there is a relation between predication and ontology, indepen-
dent of how we describe this ontology. If all definitions of truth would go
via satisfaction, Wallace argues that this would imply a strong form of the
thesis of extensionality, which says that once all obscurities and confusions
are removed from an ordinary language, the entire notion of truth for that
language can be expressed through extensional language.
An absence of satisfaction would, according to Wallace, break this rela-
tionship between truth and ontology.
In making no appeal to a range of quantification the substitutional recursion
seems to break the traditionally held connection between truth and extra-
linguistic things. And coordinately, in making no appeal to a relation of
satisfaction or denotation, it seems to undermine the importance tradition-
ally attached to predication. ("Convention T", 200)
Wallace argues that without satisfaction, we can talk about the truth of a sen-
tence without talking about the world, and we can define the truth of sen-
tences without looking at the relation between predicates and objects.
The question then is for Wallace, is it in fact necessary that any definition
of truth moves via satisfaction? He states:
The question naturally arises: is the referential structure Tarski’s theory represents
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categorial in character? Is it contained in every reasonable theory of truth? Or is it
an artifact of Tarski’s approach? ("Frame of Reference", 118)
Wallace argues that if the notion of substitution is one that is implicitly present
in any definition of truth, this says something important about the nature of
truth. Because of this, it is necessary to analyse whether alternatives are pos-
sible.
2.5 Does Substitution Entail Satisfaction?
In previous sections we have seen the standard definition of truth via sat-
isfaction and its main rival, a direct definition of truth with substitutional
quantification and a set of base-cases. We have also seen why Wallace as-
signs such an importance to the existence of a need for satisfaction. Wallace
aims for his paper to prove that the substitutional interpretation does in fact
contain a satisfaction notion. He states that
In essence, my claim will be this: if a finite theory puts enough conditions on
‘true’ to entail all instances of [I] (i.e., if it meets Tarski’s Convention T) then
it puts enough conditions on some relation ‘satisfies’ and on some name ‘Eq’
to entail [III] and all instances of [II]. Tarski showed that satisfaction is a way
to truth; I hope to persuade you that it is the way. ("Frame of Reference",
118)
This section will outline his argument for the presence of satisfaction in the
substitutional interpretation.
We saw previously that beyond defining the effect of the operators of
truth as done in (7)-(9), there was also need for a base case for the recursion.
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Wallace argues that this base case cannot be provided by simply adding as
axioms a partial definition of truth for each atomic sentence. He argues that
if we have axioms of the form
True(Able is a man) ⇐⇒ Able is a man.
True(Baker is a man) ⇐⇒ Baker is a man.
True(Cain is a man) ⇐⇒ Cain is a man.
Then we cannot derive the partial truth definition
True((∃x)(x is a man)) ⇐⇒ (∃x)(x is a man)
He argues that if we assume
True((∃x)(x is a man))
we can from (9) deduce that
(∃a)(S-class(a) & True (sub (a, x, x is a man)))
but that from here we cannot reach the wanted partial definition. Consider-
ing the conditional from right to left, Wallace states that if we assume
(∃x)(x is a man)
we can use quantifier elimination to get
m is a man
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for a singular term ‘m’ that is new for the theory, and thus is not one of the
terms previously introduces in the substitution class. No further conclusions
about individual sentences can be made, Wallace argues, and once again no
partial definition of truth can be reached ("Frame of Reference", 129).
If this argument is correct, it shows that a set axioms similar to those in-
troduced by (7)-(9) together with some atomic base cases does not fulfil con-
vention T, and should, if we accept convention T as a requirement, either be
strengthened or rejected.
Wallace proposes that the substitutional theory can be strengthened to
fulfil convention T by adding the following further axioms:
[10] True (pred (man, a)) ⇐⇒ den (a) is a man.
[11] den (Able) = Able
den (Baker) = Baker
den (Cain) = Cain
[12] (∃a)(den (a) = x) ("Frame of Reference", 130)
Where (10) says that a predication of something in the substitution class is
only true if what is being denoted has that predicate, (11) defines the deno-
tation of each term of the substitution class, and (12) states that everything is
denoted by some member of the substitution class.
A theory including (7)-(12) and a set of atomic definitions fulfills Conven-
tion T and only assigns truth to closed sentences. It thus fulfils the conditions
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(I) and (II) of Wallace’s definition via satisfaction. However, when these ax-
ioms are added, satisfaction can also be found. Wallace states that:
... it is easy to find ‘Seq’, ‘Sat’, and ‘Val’ in it. A sequence is a sequence of
members of the substitution class. ‘s Sat (Fx1...xn)’ means that the result of
substituting the k1th, ...knth member of s for the corresponding variables in
Fx1...xn is True. Val(s, n) is the denotation of the nth member of s. Eq is ob-
tained by the same method as the satisfaction theory. With these definitions,
it is straightforward to verify that (III), (IV), and (V) are provable.” ("Frame
of Reference", 131)
If Wallace’s argument is correct, then the substitutional definition covertly
contains a notion of satisfaction, and because of this, truth functions in ex-
actly the same way as in the substitutional definition, namely with truth be-
ing determined by predicates that are true of objects. If substitutional theo-
ries of truth make use of satisfaction, for Wallace this means that there can be
no question whether it is possible to define truth without a commitment to a
universe of objects.
According to Wallace, this result also holds for the Hilbert-Bernays and
the McKinsey interpretation. The Hilbert-Bernays is a more finely structured
version of the Naive interpretation that uses Gödel numbering as structural-
descriptive names, and the McKinsey interpretation defines truth of sen-
tences on the basis of truth of their set-theoretic analogues. Wallace argues
that his argument applies to both.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the argument put forward by Wallace. Wallace ar-
gues that the axioms that are provided to give a truth-definition of a substitu-
tional language do not fulfill the conditions set for truth-definitions, specif-
ically Convention T, as there are certain partial definitions that cannot be
reached. To entail all partial definitions, further axioms would need to be
added that describe the denotation of the terms, ensure that a term is only
ascribed a predicate if its denotation has that quality, and ensure that every-
thing is denoted by something. However, once this is done, it is possible
to find satisfaction in the definition. Because of this, Wallace argues that ei-
ther a substitutional truth-definition fails the essential demands of a truth-
definition, or covertly appeals to a notion of satisfaction.
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Chapter 3
Kripke On Quantification
As a response to the two papers written by Wallace and, to a lesser extent,
the paper written by Tharp which reject the idea that one can have a general
definition of truth for a substitutional language without also containing in
one way or another a notion of satisfaction, Kripke wrote the paper "Is There
a Problem of Substitutional Quantification?". In this paper, he responds to
Wallace’s arguments and aims to show that it is in fact possible to give a def-
inition of a substitutional language that does not make use of satisfaction.
Kripke summarises the central point of the papers by Wallace and Tharp
as follows:
The claim seems to be that, contrary to the usual impression, a careful ex-
amination of truth definitions for the substitutional quantifier will show that
these definitions, if they succeed at all, must make a covert appeal to some
range for the variables. (326)
This is also the argument that this paper is primarily aimed at. This chapter
will outline the arguments put forward by Kripke and see how they relate to
Wallace’s arguments.
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Kripke states that much of the confusion between substitutional and ref-
erential quantification is a result of typographical issues, namely that both
quantifiers are denoted by the same symbol. To avoid this mistake, Kripke
introduces separate notation for the referential and the substitutional quan-
tifier, with the referential quantifier and variables using the traditional nota-
tion, and the substitutional quantifier being written as (Σx) for the existential
quantifier and (Πx) for the universal quantifier, with substitutional variables
being unitalisized. This thesis will follow this typographical decision.
3.1 Definition of Truth for Substitutional Languages
Kripke defines a substitutional theory of truth as follows: first, we take a
language Lo, the sentences of which are assumed to be effectively specified
syntactically. This language will provide the set of atomic sentences for the
larger language L. We also assume that Lo contains a non-empty class C of
expressions which will be the substitution class. The members of C are called
terms and can be any class of expressions of Lo, be it individual words, sen-
tences, or even parentheses. Kripke explicitly states that we do not assume
that the terms of C denote, or are syntactically similar to the terms of a refer-
ential language.
The result of replacing zero or more terms of a sentence A of Lo with vari-
ables not contained in Lo results in an (atomic) preformula or preform. If the
result of replacing a variable with a term is itself a sentence of Lo, the prefor-
mula is called an (atomic) form.
If there is an effective test of formhood, all forms are taken to be atomic
formulae of L. If such a test is not available, a specific set of forms of Lo is
taken as the set of atomic formulae. We assume that these include all the
3.1. Definition of Truth for Substitutional Languages 25
sentences of Lo and that if φ(xi1 ...xin) is an atomic formula, so is the result of
replacing the listed variables with any other variables.
Kripke then recursively defines the set of formulas of L. He states as a
base case that atomic formulae are formulae. Then, he states that if φ and ψ
are formulae, so are φ ∧ ψ, ¬φ and Σxiφ, where the truth-functions and exis-
tential substitutional quantifiers are new notations not already present in Lo.
Sentences of L are defined on the basis of formulae of L, by saying that the
sentences of L are those formulae that do not have any free variables.
Having defined the language of L, Kripke presents a definition of truth of
sentences of L. He assumes that truth has already been defined for sentences
of Lo. This truth-definition of Lo can then be extended to the entirety of L by
saying that:
[13] ¬φ is true iff φ is not;
[14] φ ∧ ψ is true iff φ is and ψ is;
[15] Σxiφ is true iff there is a term t such that φ′ is true, where φ′ comes from
φ by replacing all free occurrences of xi by t. (Kripke, 330)
Kripke then proves that given any set S of sentences of Lo which we take to
be true sentences, there is a unique set S′ of truths of all of L satisfying (13)-
(15) and coinciding with S on Lo.
Kripke takes this as a proof that truth of L has been uniquely charac-
terised. He states that:
I would have thought that any mathematical logician at this point would con-
clude that truth for L has been characterized uniquely. If someone asserts a
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formula φ of L, we know precisely under what conditions his assertion would
be true. (Namely, that φ is a member of a set satisfying [13]-[15] and coin-
ciding with S on Lo.) (333)
Furthermore, he states that "There is no hidden fallacy in the proof that con-
ditions [13] – [15] uniquely extend a truth concept for Lo to one for L. (If
Wallace means to deny this, he is wrong)" (333).
Thus, while Wallace argues that no truth definition for substitutional quan-
tification can exist without collapsing into referential quantification, Kripke
gives a truth-definition that seem to do exactly that. Kripke writes:
There is one point which, indeed, deserves strong emphasis. This is that the
use of substitutional quantifiers cannot per se be thought of as guaranteeing
freedom from ‘ontological commitment’ (other than to expressions). It is true
that the clauses [13]-[15] can be stated without mentioning entities other
than expressions and the entities mentioned in characterizing truth for Lo. If
other entities are mentioned in characterizing truth for Lo, they still are used
when the notion is extended to L. (1976, p. 333)
However, Kripke states that this shows nothing about the collapse of the sub-
stitutional definition into the referential one, for "... there is no reason to think
that other entities are used in every truth characterization for every Lo; such
an assumption would obviously be false" (333).
Kripke also argues that we reach conceptual problems if we take the terms
of the substitution class to necessarily denote, as the substitution class can
not only consist of words, but also sentences, connectives, or parentheses.
He states that it is questionable whether we can sensibly say that such things
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denote.
Similarly, substitutional quantification into opaque contexts is possible
because the truth of opaque statements will already be contained in Lo. Ex-
tension of this to L is then unproblematic (Kripke, 334).
The first section of Kripke’s paper aims to show that it is possible to give a
recursive definition of a substitutional language, and his method of showing
this is by giving such a definition. He is at this point not occupied yet by how
this relates to the arguments of Wallace and Tharp:
Without looking any further at Wallace’s and Tharp’s arguments, I find myself sad-
dled with a complex dilemma. Perhaps they do not really mean to deny that truth
for L is intelligibly characterized, given truth for Lo, regardless of whether Lo has
opacities or any denoting terms. But it is hard for me to interpret them otherwise.
Alternatively, they mean to impose additional requirements ... But then, since it is a
theorem that truth has been characterized for L, it would seem that either (i) the ad-
ditional criteria are unjustified, or (ii) they are directed towards some problem other
than the intelligibility of ‘true in L’ ... or (iii) the claims that truth in L . . . fails to
satisfy the additional criteria are incorrect. (335)
After formalising the theory just presented 1, Kripke discusses how Wal-
lace could have missed the adequacy of these axioms. He presents three pos-
sible explanations, namely that Wallace missed the necessity of an atomic
truth condition, that Wallace focuses too much on finding a homophonic
truth theory, which this formalisation cannot present as the object language is
not included in the metalanguage, or that he objects to the use of truth pred-
icates on the right side of the partial definitions of truth. The last objection is
1The details of which can be found in (Kripke, 337-349)
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either wrong, if he objects to the use of ‘True-in-L’ on the right side, as these
sentences do not contain the predicate ‘True-in-L’, or solvable, if he objects
to the use of ‘True-in-Lo’, as there is no reason why this predicate has to be
taken as primitive, or that "if it is defined, its (explicit) definition must involve
‘semantical terms’". (Kripke, 347)
3.2 Satisfaction and Pseudo-Satisfaction
Wallace observes that just as we can characterize truth through Convention
T, the concept of satisfaction can be paradigmatically characterized through
the formula
(x1)(R(x1, φ(x1)) ⇐⇒ φ(x1))
Where any two-place predicate R(x1, α) satisfying the above formula for each
formula φ(x1) will have the satisfaction relation as its extension. This for-
mula essentially says that for all possible values of x1, the predicate R holds
of it and a specific sentence α with one free variable, only if the replacement
of this free variable with the specific value of x1 is true.
Kripke argues that such a predicate cannot be found in his homophonic
theory of truth, and that such a conclusion would be a result of a confusion
between the satisfaction predicate and the predicate ‘pseudo-satisfaction’,
which is present in his theory. For this homophonic theory, Kripke defines
P-Sat(x1, α1) as short for (∃α2)(∃α3)(Q(x1, α2) ∧ T(α3) ∧ Subst (α3, α1, α2, x1))
where Q(t, α) functions as a device like quotation which for each term t rep-
resents a formula satisfied by t alone. Then it can be shown that
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(Π x1)(P-Sat(x1, φ(x1)) ⇐⇒ φ(x1))
is a theorem for each formula φ(x1) with one free substitutional variable
(Kripke, 369). Kripke writes that:
We can conclude that it induces any relation at all only if (i) all the terms
are assigned denotations and (ii) it is transparent. As in the case of the Q-
formulae, it is easy to see that even in the exceptional case where (i) holds, (ii)
will not; the reason is that the definition of P-Sat involves the opaque form
Q(x1, α2). (369)
Kripke thus argues that satisfaction cannot be found in his theory, as pseudo-
satisfaction involves opaque contexts.
3.3 The Choice Between Quantifiers
As we have seen, Kripke regards both the substitutional and the referential
quantifier as intelligible. This does not mean that there are no limits on which
quantifier we can use. In the case of the construction of a truth-definition in
a metalanguage, the decision is made by the object language. Kripke writes
that:
In particular, if certain variables in the object language are substitutional,
they must remain so in the metalanguage. Therefore, the interpretation we
gave for Q(x, α) is forced on us, since its first variable is substitutional. It is
not just that we need not read it as Wallace does; we are prohibited from his
referential reading. (377)
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Beyond the question of interpretation of variables for the construction of
theories of truth, Kripke challenges the intelligibility of the question which
quantifier is right. "... the query goes: ‘What is the proper interpretation of
the quantifier, referential or substitutional?’ What can these queries mean?"
(377).
Rather than viewing it as two interpretations of the same concept, Kripke
views the referential and substitutional quantifiers as two different (but re-
lated) concepts. The choice which of these concepts we want to use for a
language is mostly determined by the language.
If [the queries] refer to uninterpreted first-order quantification theory (the
pure predicate calculus) the answer has already been given: both the substi-
tutional and the standard interpretation make all theorems valid. . . . The
point is that an uninterpreted formal system is just that – uninterpreted; and
it is impossible to ask for the ‘right’ interpretation. (Kripke, 377)
The question which quantifier is right for uninterpreted language becomes
a purely technical question. Kripke argues that there are some situations in
which we might give preference to a referential quantifier, such as situations
where there are objects for which no terms are available, or situations where
we might give preference to a substitutional quantifier, such as when the
quantifier would have to range over sentences (378).
In the case where the system is interpreted, these questions are unneces-
sary, Kripke states. If the language is interpreted, the symbols are already
given meaning. In this case, the quantifier that is used is determined by the
interpretation.
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3.4 Conclusion
In the conclusion to "Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantifica-
tion", Kripke concludes that there was never a problem with substitutional
quantification, and that for any class of expressions C of a language Lo, we
can extend the language with substitutional quantification, independent of
whether these expressions denote. For Kripke, “The issue of whether truth
conditions have been given for substitutional languages is one of mathemat-
ical fact, not philosophical opinion” (406).
The main conclusion of Kripke’s paper, that it is possible to give a def-
inition of truth for substitutional languages, is already obtained in its first
section. Kripke shows that if we assume the truth of an atomic language Lo,
some part of which is a substitution class C, that we can extend this atomic
truth predicate to the entirety of a language L, and that it is not necessary
that the terms of C denote. This method can also be formalised and used to
create a homophonic theory of truth.
Kripke argues that his truth-definition does not include satisfaction, as
the equivalent in his theory, Pseudo-satisfaction (P-Sat) includes the pred-
icate Q(x1, α) which is opaque. Because of this, he concludes, satisfaction
cannot be present in his theory.
Finally, Kripke argues that referential and substitutional quantification
are not two interpretations of the same concept, but rather two different con-
cepts, which can even be used together in the same language. The choice
of which quantifier we use is primarily determined by the language. If the
language is uninterpreted, we can pick any interpretation that makes all the-
orems come out as true. If the system is interpreted, the choice is determined
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by the interpretation.
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Chapter 4
Tarski and Satisfaction
The first part of this paper showed the arguments presented by Wallace and
Tharp that argue that every definition of truth of a language (covertly) makes
use of satisfaction, and the arguments by Kripke that reject these conclusions.
To put this discussion into context and see what the substantial difference
would be between referential quantification defined through satisfaction and
substitutional quantification defined through the methods stated by Kripke,
it is helpful to first answer the question of why one would need to use sat-
isfaction in the first place. This question is best answered by looking at the
works of Tarski. This section will show that the way in which Tarski builds
up his languages, combined with his notion of truth, seems to necessitate a
notion of satisfaction. It will do this through the analysis of Tarski’s works
The Concept of Truth in Formalized Language, in which Tarski first introduces
the method of satisfaction, and "Truth and Proof" in which Tarski most clearly
states his conception of truth.
4.1 Tarski and Truth
In both The Concept of Truth and Formalized Language and "Truth and Proof",
one of Tarski’s primary aims is to explain what we mean by the concept of
truth, both with respect to natural and formal languages. He aims to give a
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concrete and precise definition that conforms with our intuitive understand-
ing of the term.
Before we can determine when something is or is not true, it is first im-
portant to determine what we ascribe truth to. Traditionally, truth is seen in
one of three ways. It can be seen as a quality of a judgement, a quality of
a proposition, or as a redundant linguistic element. These are however not
the views that Tarski bases his definition on: for Tarski, truth is a semantic
notion, and is a quality that is had or not had by sentences. Tarski writes that:
In this article, however, we are interested only in what might be called the log-
ical notion of truth. More specifically, we concern ourselves exclusively with
the meaning of the term ’true’ when this term is used to refer to sentences.
Presumably this was the original use of the term ’true’ in human language.
("Truth and Proof", 63)
Thus, the term that Tarski wants to define is the quality of a sentence, and
only that, as opposed to the use of true in contexts like ’true friend’.
Secondly, Tarski is not interested in the analysis of truth as a random
metamathematical concept, but instead aims to capture the meaning of the
concept of ’truth’ that we use in our everyday life and seem to have an in-
tuitive grasp of. This intuition, Tarski holds, is captured by the traditional
philosophical explanation of truth, for example the one given by Aristotle.
Our understanding of the notion of truth seems to agree essentially with
various explanations of this notion that have been given in philosophical lit-
erature. What may be the earliest explanation can be found in Aristotle’s
metaphysics: ’to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is
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false, while to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not, is true.’
("Truth and Proof", 63)
Of this quotation he says that while in modern philosophy alternative for-
mulations have been offered, they more or less aim to capture the same idea,
whether it states that a sentence is true if it denotes a state of affairs, or that
a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality. At its core, then, Tarski holds
a correspondence theory of truth, in which the truth of a sentence in one
way or another depends on the content of the sentence matching the way the
world is. Tarski prefers the description by Aristotle over some of the mod-
ern equivalents due to its technical simplicity, and the goal of a definition of
truth should be to capture the basic intentions of this formulation whilst be-
ing more precise. ("Truth and Proof", 64)
Tarski has defined truth as a whole as a quality that sentences have if their
content matches a state of affairs in the world. An individual sentence, then,
is true if what it says is the case, and false if what it says is not the case.
We ask ourselves the question: What do we mean by saying that S is true or that it is
false? The answer to this question is simple: in the spirit of Aristotelian explanation
... we arrive at the following formulations: [16] ’snow is white’ is true if and only if
snow is white. [16′] ’snow is white’ is false if and only if snow is not white. Thus
[16] and [16′] provide satisfactory explanations of the meaning of the terms ’true’
and ’false’ when these terms are referred to the sentence ’snow is white’. ("Truth
and Proof", 64)
An important remark to make here is that according to the present defini-
tion, the truth-definition does not need to be homophonic. In the example of
’snow is white’ given above, the truth-definition is homophonic, in that the
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sentence for which we define truth is repeated exactly in the second half of
the definition. However, the definition would work equally well if this was
not the case. Thus, we could have an alternative version of (16) that defines
not the truth of a particular English sentence but of a particular German sen-
tence as "’Schnee ist weiß’ is true if and only if snow is white."
A definition such as was given above for the sentence ’snow is white’ can
also be made for any other sentence that we come across. For each sentence
’p’ we can construct a definition of the form
(17) ’p’ is true if and only if p
where ’p’ is to be replaced on the left side by the sentence for which we are
constructing the definition and on the right side by its translation into the
language that we are using.
As a whole, we want to find a semantic definition, which for each sen-
tence of a language says that it is true if it describes a state of affairs in the
world, and that state of affairs actually is the case. Furthermore, the semantic
definition has to be formally correct and materially adequate, that is to say,
for each sentence ’p’ of the language, it should entail a definition of the form
given by (17). This second requirement is called Convention T.
4.2 Constructing a Definition of Truth
In The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, Tarski attempts to give a defi-
nition along these lines for truth of natural languages. However, this quickly
runs into problems due to the fact that natural languages are not semanti-
cally closed: they contain semantic terms that refer to the language itself.
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For example, it is possible to talk about the truth of English sentences in En-
glish. Because of this, we can construct problems such as the Liar Paradox.
We construct a sentence ’p’ that states "’p’ is false.". If we follow the meth-
ods previously given, for this sentence we would build the following partial
truth-definition for the sentence ‘p’:
(18) ’p’ is true if and only if ’p’ is false
This partial truth-definition quite straightforwardly results in a paradox.
Because of this problem, Tarski concludes that truth cannot be defined
for natural languages, and he continues with finding a truth definition for
formal languages. Formal languages are semantically closed, and because
of this cannot lead to versions of the Liar paradox. Tarski defines these lan-
guages as languages which "can be roughly characterized as artificially con-
structed languages in which the sense of every expression is unambiguously
determined by its form" (Concept of Truth, 166). It is important to note that
Tarski does not view formal languages as lacking meaning. He writes that:
It remains perhaps to add that we are not interested here in ’formal’ languages
and sciences in one special sense of the word ’formal’, namely sciences to the
signs and expressions of which no material sense is attached. For such sci-
ences the problem here discussed has no relevance, it is not even meaningful.
We shall always ascribe quite concrete and, for us, intelligible meanings to
the signs which occur in the languages we shall consider. The expressions
which we call sentences still remain sentences after the signs which occur in
them have been translated into colloquial language. (Concept of Truth, 167)
While the language is formally defined and unambiguously determined by
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its form, it should still be seen as an actual part of language, with concrete
and intelligible meaning, not as an abstract object of study. Because of this,
the concepts of truth of this formal language should also be intelligible and
natural to us.
The sentences which are distinguished as axioms seem to us to be materially
true, and in choosing rules of inference we are always guided by the principle
that when such rules are applied to true sentences, the sentences obtained by
their use should also be true. (Tarski, Concept of Truth, 167)
This means that ’true’ and ’false’ cannot be seen as a more-or-less arbitrary
division of sentences into two sets, but should conform to the intuitive corre-
spondence notion that was defined above.
As the formal language itself is semantically closed, it cannot not contain
its own truth predicate. Because of this, we cannot give the truth definition
in the language for which we want to find a truth definition. Instead, we
distinguish between object language, the language for which we aim to give
a truth definition, and the metalanguage, the language in which this truth
definition is given.
If the language for which we want to define truth is finite, giving a def-
inition is entirely unproblematic. We can for each sentence build a partial
definition of the form (17). We can then define the entire notion of truth for
the language through the conjunction of all these partial definitions.
However, if the language for which we are trying to construct a truth defi-
nition is infinite, this method cannot be successful, as it is impossible to finish
such a definition:
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But the situation is not like this. Whenever a language contains infinitely
many sentences, the definition constructed automatically according to the
above scheme would have to consist of infinitely many words, and such sen-
tences cannot be formulated either in the metalanguage or in any other lan-
guage. Our task is thus greatly complicated. (Tarski, Concept of Truth, 188)
Almost all of the formal languages which we are interested in will contain
infinitely many sentences, not only owing to the wanted inclusion of stan-
dard logical operators such as conjunction, negation and quantification, but
also because many of these formal languages require the possibility of talking
about infinite or expandable lists of objects. Because of this, another method
of giving truth definitions is required.
4.3 Recursive Truth Definitions
The preferred method of giving truth definitions would be through recur-
sion, where some atomic sentences would be determined and the truth-
definition of these simple sentences would be explicitly given in the style de-
scribed above. Then, a list would be given of the operations through which
simpler sentences are combined into composite ones, and how the truth of
these composite sentences depends on the truth of the simpler sentences.
Through this, all sentences of the language could be constructed. However,
Tarski argues that this method cannot succeed.
His demonstration of this impossibility starts with an illustration of a lan-
guage of the calculus of classes. For the calculus of classes, he defines a primi-
tive predicate, namely inclusion, and three fundamental operations by means
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of which compound expressions are formed from simpler ones, namely nega-
tion, logical addition and universal quantification. Then, if we begin with the
inclusion i of the variables vk and vl., written as ik,l, and apply the fundamen-
tal operations any number of times, we obtain a class of expressions which
Tarski calls sentential functions. Tarski defines the list of sentential functions
by stating that x is a sentential function if and only if (a) k and l are natural
numbers and x = ik,l, (b) x is the negation of y and y is a sentential function,
(c) x is the conjunction of y and z, where y and z are sentential functions, or
(d) there is a natural number k and a sentential function y, and x states that
for all k, y.
Tarski defines the free variables vk of a sentential function x as the vari-
ables for which k is a number distinct from 0, and for which either (a) x = ik,l,
(b) x is the negation of y and k is a free variable in y (c) x is the conjunction
of y and z, and k is free in either y or z, or (d) there is a natural number l
different from k and a sentential function y, and x states that for all l, y, and
k is free in y.
Then, he defines sentences as just those sentential functions for which
none of the variables are free. Sentences are thus special cases of sentential
functions.
However, if we accept this as the structure of the language for which we
want to give a truth-definition, the recursive method runs into problems.
Tarski writes that:
In attempting to realize this idea we are however confronted with a serious
obstacle. Even a superficial analysis of Defs 10-12 of Par 2 shows that in
general composite sentences are in no way compounds of simple sentences.
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Sentential functions do in fact arise in this way from elementary functions,
i.e. from inclusions; sentences on the contrary are certain special cases of sen-
tential functions. In view of this fact, no method can be given which would
enable us to define the required concept directly by recursive means. (Concept
of Truth, 189)
The recursive method cannot work, because the recursive method would
need to be recursively defined over sentences, but sentences are not built
out of simpler sentences, but out of sentential functions.
4.4 Satisfaction
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, for a language of infinite size, it
is impossible to define truth via a recursive method over sentences, as sen-
tences are not made up out of simpler sentences, but out of sentential func-
tions. If a recursive method is still desired, it will have to make use of recur-
sion over sentential functions. However, this cannot be a recursive definition
of truth because, as we have seen, truth is a property of sentences. Because
of this, a recursive method over sentential functions will have to make use of
another predicate, which can then in turn be related to the truth of the spe-
cific sentential functions that are sentences. This is also the approach taken
by Tarski. He writes that:
The possibility suggests itself, however, of introducing a more general con-
cept which is applicable to any sentential function, can be recursively defined,
and, when applied to sentences, leads us directly to the concept of truth. These
requirements are met by the notion of the satisfaction of a given sentential
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function by given objects, and in the present case by given classes of indi-
viduals (Concept of Truth, 189).
This is the reason that Tarski introduces a notion of satisfaction: unlike truth,
satisfaction as a predicate can range over sentential functions. From this, we
can recursively define satisfaction over all sentential functions in the way
that was shown by Wallace in the first part of this paper. From satisfaction
we can define the truth of sentences, by saying that a true sentence is one
that is satisfied by all sequences and a false sentence one that is satisfied by
no sequences. From this truth definition we can in turn derive all the partial
truth definitions required by convention T.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that Tarski viewed truth not as an abstract math-
ematical notion, but as a notion of natural language which ranges over sen-
tences and of which we have an intuitive grasp, namely that a true sentence
is one whose content corresponds with reality. For finite languages we can
straightforwardly define truth by saying of each sentence whether it is true
or not through an explicit definition. For an infinite language, Tarski argues
that such a method cannot work, because we would never be able to finish
this explicit definition. Because of this, we need to create a recursive defini-
tion.
The recursive definition that would be most preferable is one in which
we define the truth of some set of atomic sentences and define several truth-
functional operators through which all other sentences are constructed. How-
ever, Tarski argues that this is problematic, as sentences are not made up out
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of simpler sentences, but out of sentential functions, for which truth cannot
be defined. As a result, Tarski introduces the notion of satisfaction, which we
can recursively define for all sentential functions. From satisfaction, we can
derive the truth of a sentence.
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Chapter 5
Kripke’s Definition of
Substitutional Truth
As we have seen in chapter 3, Kripke argues that satisfaction is not required
to define truth for a language with substitutional quantification, and gives
a recursive truth definition of the basis of a pre-given truth definition of an
atomic language Lo. He then argues that this definition clearly shows that
satisfaction is not required to define truth. However, in the previous chapter
we have seen that Tarski introduced the notion of satisfaction because he
was unable to create a recursive definition for truth defined over sentences.
This chapter will look more into the recursive definition of truth given by
Kripke, and analyse whether, and if so how, Kripke avoids the issues that
motivated Tarski to define truth via satisfaction. It will do this by first looking
in more detail at the definition given by Kripke, and then by analysing how
the atomic truth predicate is defined.
5.1 Kripke’s Truth Definition
The truth definition that Kripke proposes appears multiple times throughout
"Is There a Problem of Substitutional Quantification", once in section 1, where
it is informally defined, once in section 2, where it is given a formal defini-
tion, and once in section 5, where a specifically homophonic version is given.
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Furthermore, he gives some variants of the definition, such as one where the
metalanguage itself also makes use of substitution quantification. However,
for this thesis, a focus on the initial informal definition will be enough.
As we have seen, Kripke first introduces a language Lo, the sentences of
which will serve as the atomic sentences of the language L. This language
Lo is assumed to be effectively specified syntactically. It is also assumed that
Lo has a non-empty class C of expressions, the elements of which will be
called terms. These terms will form the substitution class for the substitu-
tional quantification. Kripke specifically states that we do not assume that
the terms of Lo are syntactically similar to the terms of a referential language,
and that terms could be any class of expressions of Lo, such as sentences, con-
nectives or even parentheses.
The language L is an extension of Lo. Kripke defines the formulae of L in-
ductively, taking Lo as the atomic formulae of L, and stating that if φ and ψ are
formulae, so are φ ∧ ψ, ¬φ and (Σxi)φ. It is assumed that the truth-functions
and substitutional quantifier are new notions that are not yet present in Lo. If
φ and ψ are sentences of L, so are φ ∧ ψ and ¬φ. (Σxi)φ is a sentence of L iff
φ is a formula with at most xi free.
Kripke then assumes that truth has been defined for the sentences of Lo.
Then, he states that the extended truth conditions for sentences of L are:
[13] ¬φ is true iff φ is not;
[14] φ ∧ ψ is true iff φ is and ψ is;
[15] Σxiφ is true iff there is a term t such that φ′ is true, where φ′ comes from
φ by replacing all free occurrences of xi by t. (330)
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Important to note here is that the formulae of L, the sentences of L, and the
truth of L, are all defined recursively on the basis of the pre-defined language
Lo.
5.2 On the Use of Lo
This leads us to an interesting point where Tarski believes that satisfaction
is necessary because it is impossible to give a recursive definition of truth,
and Kripke states that he has given a recursive definition of truth. How does
Kripke avoid the problems raised by Tarski?
A key part of Kripke’s proof of the unique existence of a recursive def-
inition of truth for a language L is the existence of a definition of truth for
atomic language Lo. To gain more insight into Kripke’s definition of truth, it
is useful to look more at this notion of atomic truth.
Kripke says several things about the truth definition of the atomic lan-
guage Lo. First of all, he is of the opinion that it is obvious and unproblematic
that one needs to make use of a concept ’true in Lo.’ Wallace states of this re-
cursive definition that "I think that some philosophers will resist the idea that
[13]-[15] are not already an adequate account of truth conditions" ("Frame
of Reference", 233). To this, Kripke replies that philosophers most certainly
should resist this idea, because there is nothing wrong with the proof that the
conditions (13)-(15) uniquely extend a truth concept for Lo to one for L. He
then states:
Perhaps Wallace means that [13]-[15] are not enough by themselves; we must
have the concept ’true in Lo’ (the set S) already. This is true enough, but
no lengthy disquisitions are needed to establish the point. It has nothing
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to do with substitutional quantification; it would remain true even if [15]
and (Σxi) were dropped from the language and only the truth-functions re-
mained. Of course an inductive definition requires a basis; we can only use
[13]-[15] to extend truth for Lo to L. Who ever thought otherwise? The phe-
nomenon is characteristic of all recursive definitions. (333)
Kripke seems to take this to show that there is no reason to worry about
the use of a pre-defined truth definition for Lo, however, if this is indeed his
argument, he is wrong: while a recursive definition does indeed require a
basis, and there is nothing wrong with using a basis in a recursive definition,
giving an (attempted) recursive definition does mean that this basis also un-
problematically exist. Instead, it means that the basis is required for such a
recursive definition, and that if the basis does not exist, the definition fails.
Because of this, the above quotation says nothing concrete about the exis-
tence and content of the required Lo.
Kripke shows more of how he views Lo when he discusses whether this
truth definition and substitutional quantification guarantee freedom from
’ontological commitment’. Here, he states that:
It is true that the clauses [13]-[15] can be stated without mentioning entities
other than expressions and the entities mentioned in characterizing truth for
Lo. If other entities are mentioned in characterizing truth for Lo, they are
still used when the notion is extended to L. Note that, however, there is no
reason to think that other entities are used in every truth characterization for
every Lo; such an assumption would be obviously false. (333)
Kripke clearly views the truth-definition of Lo as something that can, at least
possibly, be defined without reference to objects. This is further confirmed by
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a similar point he makes in the discussion of the formal truth theory, where
the atomic truth-definition of Lo is called R(α):
Does the meta-theory involve an ontology of expressions alone? As stated, it
does, since R(α) was taken as primitive ... Suppose, however, we wish not
to take R(α) as primitive but to define it in terms of more basic primitives.
After all, R(α) is itself a truth predicate for a primitive language Lo, and for
each particular language L we may wish this predicate to be explained. The
definition of R(α) in more basic terms depends heavily on the choice of Lo;
we can in general say nothing specific about R(α) other than what has been
said above. Whether the definition of R(α) requires us to extend the ontology
of the metalanguage beyond an ontology of expressions alone depends both
on the choice of Lo and on the question of what predicates of expressions (or,
alternatively, via Gödel numbering, of numbers) we are willing to take as
primitive. (343-344)
Here Kripke once again argues that while it is possible that the truth of Lo
refers to objects, this is by no means a requirement.
5.3 Truth-Definitions For Lo
For the construction of truth-definitions of an atomic language Lo, we can
distinguish between the definitions for a Lo with a finite amount of sentences
and a Lo with an infinite amount of sentences.
In the case of a Lo with a finite amount of sentences, it is relatively easy to
construct a truth-definition that does not require any objects beyond the ex-
pressions of the language itself. Like with a language L with a finite amount
of sentences, we can simply for each sentence say whether it is true or not.
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This results in a complete definition of True-In-Lo. This definition of Lo can
then be recursively expanded to a language L with a substitutional quanti-
fier, as all the sentences of L are made up out of previous sentences.
An explicit definition of a language Lo of finite length can through (13)-
(15) provide the truth for the language L without any reference to objects or
sentential functions. This method is not open to languages with a referential
quantifier, as per definition, the referential quantifier makes use of the sen-
tential function. The substitutional language can avoid the use of satisfaction
in cases in which there exists a Lo of finite length, and in these cases it signif-
icantly differs in truth-definition from referential languages, for which this
possibility does not exist.
Does this result also hold for languages L whose atomic language Lo has
an infinite amount of sentences? Such a language is introduced by Kripke
himself as an example of a language that is syntactic and does not require the
use of any objects or denotation. He states that:
Let me give an example of what I just called the ’most favoured case’. The
terms of Lo are arbitrary strings of the letters ’a’ and ’b’. A formula of Lo is
anything of the form M(t1, t2) where t1 and t2 are two terms. Such a formula
counts as true whenever the first string is the mirror image of the second; for
example, M(abb, bba) is true while M(abb,bab) is false. This truth character-
ization for Lo is indeed syntactic, and the truth characterization can then be
extended to the larger language L by means of [4]-[6)]. Note that no question
arises of any ’denotations’ for the ’terms’ – the terms are merely uninterpreted
strings of the letters ’a’ and ’b’. Nor do the substitutional variables have any
’range’. (345)
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There is indeed no doubt that this truth characterization does not add an
ontology of objects beyond the ontology of expressions. However, we can
wonder about the importance of that finding. The language based on the
predicate M(t1, t2) is a language about expressions, and because of this, a
language with referential quantifier and truth definition would also be lim-
ited to an ontology of expressions. This, then, is not enough to show that the
two languages are fundamentally different.
It is also not obvious whether it is really the case that the terms of this
language do not denote. To be a language, the sentences have to be about
something. If it is not, we are not talking about a language and not talking
about truth, we are merely looking at an abstract mathematical construct.
This language is about something, namely whether two strings mirror each
other. The terms, then, do denote something, namely these strings. The string
is a syntactical object about which the language is, but at the same time each
string is the name of itself. This also, then, does not distinguish between the
substitutional and referential languages, as both deal with the same things,
namely strings made up out of the letters ’a’ and ’b’. Kripke does discuss this
autonymous interpretation, in which each term designates itself, but says of
it that:
I assume, however, that this trivial interpretation is not all that Wallace is
claiming when he argues that satisfaction invariably lurks in the background
of the substitutional quantifier. Indeed, even without the autonymous inter-
pretation, it is clear that every substitutional formula is equivalent to one
involving referential quantifiers over expressions. (353)
However, denotation is a requirement for satisfaction, be it trivial denotation
or otherwise. Even if the denotation is trivial, it seems unwise to decide the
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question of satisfaction by rejecting autonymous denotation for being trivial.
Kripke states that we can give a truth characterization by saying that a
formula of the form M(t1, t2) counts as true whenever the first string is the
mirror image of the second string. It seems that Kripke assumes that through
this, we can effectively give a truth characterization of the entirety of Lo. It
is, however, not entirely obvious how this would work. We can see that the
language Lo is one with an infinite amount of sentences. The formulas of Lo
are all those of the form M(t1, t2), where the terms are arbitrary strings of the
letters ’a’ and ’b’. As these strings can be of any length, there is an infinite
amount of strings, and thus an infinite amount of formulas of the form M(t1,
t2). Because of this, we cannot simply look at each formula of Lo and for
each one see whether the terms mirror each other, as this task could never be
completed. We can also not say for each individual formula M(a, b) that it is
true if the terms mirror each other and false otherwise, because, like with the
explicit definition, we would need to create an infinite amount of these par-
tial definitions. Instead, we need to talk about all sentences of the form M(t1,
t2), and define the truth for all these sentences. The truth characterization,
then, does not deal directly with the individual sentences of Lo, but rather
with the infinite set of all sentences of the form M(t1, t2), or alternatively the
sentential function M(t1, t2) which determines the membership of the set of
all sentences of the form M(t1, t2). We have seen in the previous chapter that
for Tarski, truth was a quality of sentences, and sentences alone. Here, what
we define for the infinite set of all sentences of the form M(t1, t2) or the sen-
tential function M(t1, t2) cannot be truth, as neither the set nor the sentential
function are sentences. Instead, it needs to say of the form M(t1, t2) that it
would be true in certain situations.
A method using satisfaction would here, following Tarski, create the truth
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definition in the following way. The form M(t1, t2) would be taken as the sen-
tential function. Satisfaction would be defined as for every a and b, we have a
and b satisfy M(t1, t2) if and only if a is the mirror image of b. This could be ex-
tended into satisfaction by infinite sequences to deal with longer sentences.
Then, truth of a sentence would be defined as a sentence satisfied by every
sequence.
Here we can wonder whether the method using satisfaction substantially
differs from the one informally used by Kripke, and I do not think it does.
’A formula of Lo is anything of the form M(t1, t2)’ functions exactly the same as
taking M(t1, t2) as a sentential function that is later instantiated by turning
the variables into concrete individual terms. The statement ’Such a formula
counts as true whenever the first string is the mirror image of the second’ seems to
informally at the same time both play the same role as defining something
similar to satisfaction for M(t1, t2) and define truth for instantiated senten-
tial functions on the basis of this satisfaction-like concept. If we assume that
we have the formula M(abb, t2) it would make sense to say that this formula
would count as true if we were to take t2 to mean ’bba’, but not if we took
t2 to mean ’bab’. We can say that an instantiation of M(t1, t2) is true iff t1 is
a mirror instance of t2. This concept that says of sentential functions when it
would or would not be true essentially fulfils the exact same role as satisfac-
tion. It does not seem that we can avoid seeing it as a satisfaction-predicate,
just because it lacks the explicit formal definition and the proper terminology.
We could equally well say that a pair t1, t2 satisfies M(t1, t2) iff t1 is a mirror
instance of t2, and the rest of the definition would stay exactly the same.
As we have seen previously, Wallace observed that just as we can paradig-
matically characterize truth through convention T, we can paradigmatically
characterize satisfaction through the formula
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(x1)(R(x1, φ(x1)) ⇐⇒ φ(x1))
Where any two-place predicate R(x1, α) satisfying the above formula for each
formula φ(x1) will have the satisfaction relation as its extension. This specific
definition holds for formulae with one free variable, but we can easily con-
struct an alternative for formulae with two free variables, namely
(x1)(x2)(R(x1, x2, φ(x1, x2)) ⇐⇒ φ(x1, x2))
Where R is a three-place predicate with satisfaction by pairs of objects as its
extension. If the truth-definition for the atomic language Lo fulfils this def-
inition, per Kripke himself, satisfaction is present in the definition. If we
take the class of objects over which the quantification ranges to be the set of
all expressions of arbitrary length made up out of ‘a’ and ‘b’, then per the
definition given by Kripke of truth of Lo, for all x1 and x2, and all formulas
φ(x1, x2), which in this case is only the formula M(x1, x2), we can per the
above suggestion construct a predicate R(x1, x2, α) such that all partial def-
initions of satisfaction hold. As a result of this, satisfaction is present in the
truth-characterisation for language Lo.
In this specific case, the P-Sat predicate that Kripke showed was present in
his theories can be expanded to satisfaction. Kripke stated that it induces a re-
lation if all the terms are assigned denotations and it is transparent. He states
that it was possible that all the terms had denotations, but not that it was
transparent, as P-Sat included the opaque predicate Q(x1, α2). Here, all terms
have denotations, as we gave an autonymous interpretation in which each
term denotes itself. The first condition is thus fulfilled. As for the opaque-
ness of Q, as it ranges over terms, it is unproblematic to quantify into it with
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a referential quantifier if the range of objects over which the quantification
happens is a range of terms. In this specific case then, P-Sat does equate to
normal satisfaction.
As we have seen, in this specific case the satisfaction-class ranges over
autonymous denotations, which each term denoting itself. The next chapter
will discuss whether this will always be the required satisfaction-class. It will
also discuss whether it will always be the case that satisfaction can be found
in any theory with an infinite amount of atomic sentences.
The reasons that such a predicate like satisfaction also has to be present
in Kripke’s definition are the same that motivated Tarski to define truth via
satisfaction to begin with: first of all, for a language with an infinite amount
of sentences, we cannot define truth explicitly. Secondly, sentences are not
made up out of simpler sentences but out of sentential functions.
If Kripke’s definition of this specific language Lo contains satisfaction,
then the language L which is an extension of Lo through conjunction, nega-
tion and quantification also contains satisfaction. Assume that the instantia-
tion of a variable ti or tj of M(ti, tj) with terms has been defined as true iff all
sequences replacing the ith or jth place with the specific term satisfies M(t1,
t2). Then we can prove that the language L as a whole also has a truth defi-
nition via satisfaction.
Proof. Assume that φ and ψ are satisfied or not by n and m terms in an infinite
sequence s and that φ and ψ are true iff all sequences satisfy them and false
if it is satisfied by no sequence.
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(19) Negation
A sentence ¬φ is true iff φ is not.
A sentence φ is not true if no sequence satisfies it.
A sequence does not satisfy φ iff it satisfies ¬φ.
A sentence φ is not true if all sequences satisfy ¬φ.
A sentence ¬φ is true iff all sequences satisfies ¬φ.
(20) Conjunction
A sentence φ ∧ ψ is true iff φ is true and ψ is true.
A sentence φ is true iff the n relevant terms of all sequences satisfy φ.
A sentence ψ is true iff the m relevant terms of all sequences satisfy ψ.
A sentence φ ∧ ψ is true if all sequences satisfy φ and all sequences
satisfy ψ.
A sequences satisfies φ and ψ iff it satisfies φ ∧ ψ.
A sentence φ ∧ ψ is true if all sequences satisfy φ ∧ ψ.
(21) Existential Substitutional Quantification
A sentence (Σxi)φ is true iff there is a sentence φ′ that is true where φ′
is the result of replacing a variable xi with a term in φ.
A sentence φ′ where a variable xi is replaced by a term t is satisfied by
a sequence iff this sequence would satisfy φ if its ith member would
be replaced by t.
A sentence φ′ is true iff it is satisfied by all sequences.
A sentence (Σxi)φ is true iff all sequences satisfy φ if their ith mem-
bers would be replaced by t.
Per assumption, the truth of all atomic sentences of L can be defined via sat-
isfaction. Per induction, the truth of all sentences of L can be defined via
satisfaction. This proof shows that if we accept that the truth definition of
Lo contains satisfaction, the truth definition of the entirety of the language L
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contains satisfaction.
Does this conclusion that Kripke here covertly appeals to satisfaction hold
for any pair of languages Lo and L? Clearly not. The step towards satisfaction
was only required because we were dealing with an atomic language with
an infinite amount of sentences. Had the language Lo been of finite size,
it would be possible to define the truth of each formula of Lo explicitely and
build L from that. L would in this situation still be a language with an infinite
amount of sentences. However, if the language Lo is of infinite size, it will
always be necessary to define the truth of Lo in a way that does not directly
deal with the formulae of Lo, but instead discusses more general forms and
what would make such forms true. This is exactly what satisfaction does.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that Kripke aims to give a truth-definition of
the language L by recursively defining it over a pre-given truth-definition of
the atomic language Lo. However, further analysis has shown that this is not
unproblematic. If Lo is a language with an infinite amount of sentences, it is
impossible to define the truth of the sentences of Lo explicitly. The method
that Kripke uses to define truth of a language with an infinite amount of sen-
tences seems to work exactly the same as Tarski’s method using satisfaction,
with the difference being in wording and less detailed explanation in the case
of Kripke. If the truth of a language Lo is defined through satisfaction, then
the truth of language L which is an extension of Lo through the use of con-
junction, negation and quantification is also defined through satisfaction.
While there are certainly languages with a substitutional quantifier and
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an infinite amount of sentences that can be defined without appealing to sat-
isfaction, which does not hold for similar languages with a referential quan-
tifier, there also seem to be languages with a substitutional quantifier that do
have to (covertly) appeal to satisfaction. In these cases, however, the differ-
ences between the substitutional and referential quantifiers are still present.
Because of this, the differences between the two quantifiers cannot be ex-
plained through their respective use of satisfaction.
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Chapter 6
Terms, Denotation and Ontology
The previous chapter has shown that to provide a truth-definition for a lan-
guage L through a recursive definition of truth, it is necessary to assume a
pre-given truth of Lo. However, if this language Lo is itself also infinite, it
is necessary to use a notion that is equivalent to satisfaction for the truth-
definition of Lo, which in turn leads to the truth of L also being determined
by satisfaction. This holds both for languages using referential quantifiers
and substitutional quantifiers. However, while it is clear that sentential for-
mulae of a referential language are satisfied by objects, it is yet unclear what
satisfies the sentential formulae of substitutional languages. In the example
in the previous language, the terms had an autonymous denotation, but it
is unclear whether this always works. This chapter will look at the objects
used by a substitutional language, and the relation between the terms of a
substitutional language and the objects that a language makes use of.
6.1 Terms and Denotation
Kripke rejects the idea that the terms of language L must denote. He writes
that:
Wallace and Tharp, especially the former, seem to argue that the ’terms’ must
denote or a determination of truth conditions for L will be impossible. Since
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any class of expressions of Lo can be the substitution class, and since Lo can
be any language, and since we can extend a truth concept for Lo to L au-
tomatically, such a result would seem to mean that any expressions of any
language must denote, a rather astounding result. (334)
Any class of expressions of Lo can be the terms of the substitution class, so
if we hold that all terms of the substitution class must denote, then any ex-
pression of Lo must denote. The idea that all expressions must denote has,
according to Kripke, ridiculous consequences:
True, for injudicious choices of the substitution class there will be very few
forms. It is entirely feasible, however, to let the substitution class consist of
the sentences of Lo (see Section 5(a)). Does this provide an a priori proof
of Frege’s view that sentences denote? Suppose Lo contains connectives, say
primitive truth-functions ∧,¬,∨,⇒, ⇐⇒ . The substitution class can con-
sist of expressions where a sentence of Lo is followed by a binary connective.
Then xψ, where ψ is a sentence, is a form, and (Σxi)xψ is implied by each
of its instances φ1 ⇒ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ⇐⇒ ψ, φ2 ⇒ ψ, etc. Is this supposed
to mean that expressions such as ’φ ⇒’ denote? Usually they are not even
regarded as significant units! (334)
The reason that Wallace argues that the ’terms’ must denote is his belief that
without denotation, we cannot fulfill the requirement of convention T. He
specifically argues that it is impossible to derive the sentence
True((∃x)(x is a man) ⇐⇒ (∃x)(x is a man)
from his equivalent of (13)-(15) together with some partial definition of truth
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for atomic sentences. He argues that to do this, it is necessary to add the fol-
lowing axioms:
[22] a predication of man with a member of the substitution class, say a, is
true if and only if the denotation of a is a man.
[23] the denotation of Able = Able
the denotation of Baker = Baker
the denotation of Cain = Cain
and so on for each member of the substitution class.
[24] everything is denoted by some member of the substitution class. ("Frame
of Reference", 129-130)
This critique fails, as the sentence that Wallace claims needs to be derived
for convention T is not in fact a partial truth definition. Wallace interprets
the first quantifier as substitutional and the second quantifier as referential.
The formula that he tries to derive can, following Kripke’s typology, better
be written as True((∃x)(x is a man) ⇐⇒ (Σx)(x is a man). As the two parts
mean something different, there is no need for this sentence to be provable
to fulfill convention T.
However, while Wallace’s argument is wrong, that does not mean that his
conclusions are entirely wrong as well. The need for denotation is not a result
of convention T, but a result of the concept of truth. As we have seen, Tarski
views truth as something that describes a relationship between a sentence
and the world, and it was this notion that we tried to capture. However, this
means that we cannot view the object language for which we try to define
truth as uninterpreted: the object language is not a mathematical object but
an actual language, with meaning. Meaning is required for us to find truth. If
a sentence does not have meaning, it cannot say anything about the world,
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and as such we can say nothing about its relation to the world. However,
the thing that must denote is not necessarily the terms of the substitution
class, but rather the words of the language of Lo. These are the entities that
determine the meaning of the sentences of Lo, even in the cases where the
substitution class is made up of things like parentheses and connectives.
If the language for which we are constructing a truth-definition deals en-
tirely with syntactic issues, such as the language containing M(t1, t2) it is
sufficient to have an ontology that contains just syntactical entities, as it is a
language that speaks only of syntactical issues. However, if we have a lan-
guage that deals with non-syntactic objects, references to objects beyond the
syntactic are necessary. This holds not just for languages with an infinite
amount of atomic sentences: even if we have a completely finite language
for which we can give an explicit definition of truth, this language still has to
have defined denotations to the objects about which it speaks. If we took the
sentence ’snow is white’ as nothing but an uninterpreted string, what could
justify us in saying that this sentence is true if snow is white?
We have seen that some reference to objects is necessary. At the same time,
however, it seems that interpreting the substitutional quantifier as range over
denotations of terms leads to equally big conceptual trouble. One of the main
advantages of the use of a substitutional quantifier is that it can quantify into
opaque contexts. Assume a pair of true sentences ’John believes that he can
see the Morning Star’ and ’John does not believe that he can see the Evening
Star’, where the Morning Star and the Evening Star co-designate one object,
namely the planet Venus. The referential quantifier cannot be used to quan-
tify into this opaque context. Doing so would result in the sentence ’There
is an x so that John believes that he can see x’, but which object would this
x be? If it is the Morning Star, then it is the Evening Star, of which John did
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not believe that he could see it. If, however, we quantify over terms, it is
perfectly unproblematic. This would result in the sentence ’There is a term x
so that John believes that he can see x’, which is true, as there exists the term
’Morning Star’, which does not equal ’Evening Star’, of which it is true that
John believes he can see it. If we were to claim that the terms over which a
substitutional quantifier ranges must denote and that this denotation must
determine the satisfaction and truth of formulae, this benefit would be lost.
In fact, not only this benefit would be lost, but the substitutional quantifier
would collapse into the referential quantifier, as we shall see in the next sec-
tion. Kripke writes about the problems of opacity and denotation that:
The same puzzlement arises with respect to opacity. Suppose the terms of Lo
do denote; the truth characterization for Lo somehow uses the concept of deno-
tation for all the terms. Then Lo may contain opacities; codesignative terms
may not be intersubstitutable in Lo salva veritate. Yet this phenomenon, if
it exists, will be entirely irrelevant to the extension of Lo to L, and of truth
for Lo to truth for L. L will then contain ’substitutional quantification into
opaque contexts’, this is why the conventional view asserts that such quan-
tification is unproblematic. Wallace challenges this view. Does he challenge
the theorem on which it is based (that a truth characterization for Lo uniquely
extends to L)? If not, there can be no trouble with truth for L which was not
already trouble with truth for Lo. (334)
Wallace challenges this view precisely because he believes that the truth and
satisfaction of a sentence are determined entirely by its denotation. Because
of this, he argues that co-designative terms in Lo are already problematic, and
cannot be expanded to L.
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6.2 Equivalence between Referential and Substi-
tutional Quantifiers
So far, we have seen that it is necessary that a substitutional language gives
denotations to its terms, because if it does not there is nothing that makes a
sentence true or false, but that at the same time, this denotation cannot be
taken as determining the entire satisfaction and truth of a sentence, as this
would disable some of the benefits of substitutional quantification. To get
further insight into the relations between the referential and substitutional
quantifier, it is useful to look at the situations in which they can be said to be
equivalent. Kripke writes that:
In the most favoured case we can drop R(α) and define the class of true atomic
strings without introducing any new vocabulary or ontology not already in
the metalanguage; in this case, no-one could conceivably quarrel with the
claim that our axiomatic theory involves an ontology of expressions alone.
Otherwise, we can add either new predicates true of strings, or new ontol-
ogy, or both, to the metalanguage M. If we extend the ontology of the meta-
language, and add a new binary predicate of denotation to the metalanguage,
relating the terms to some of the new entities, and postulate that every term
denotes one of the new entities, and certain additional conditions to be de-
tailed in the first half of Section 3 are satisfied, then we can say, as we will in
Section 3, that the substitutional quantifiers of L are in a sense equivalent to
Referential quantifiers. Otherwise, the new ontology may have nothing to do
with the terms or alleged denotata for them. (344)
To be able to say that the referential and the substitutional quantifier are
equivalent it is necessary that (a) both quantifiers extend the ontology of the
metalanguage with the same objects, (b) all the terms are taken to denote,
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and (c) each of the objects added in (a) has a term. Later, Kripke states the
condition that (d) "all formulae in L are transparent" (353).
Of these (a) has been shown to be the case earlier in this chapter. If two
languages, one with a substitutional quantifier and one with a referential
quantifier, deal with the same topics, then it is necessary that they add the
same objects to the pre-given ontology of expressions. Without this ontology
of objects, the referential language would not function, and the substitutional
language would not be a ’language’ in the meaning that we intend. (b) has
also been fulfilled. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that to be a sentence, each
part of the sentence had to say something, and as such each term had to de-
note. Where this leads to problems, such as in a language which talks about
strings, or where the terms are expressions that are not usually taken to have
meaning such as ’φ ⇒’ or punctuation marks, we can offer an autonymous
interpretation, where these expressions denote themselves. (c) is normally
raised as one of the key problems with substitutional quantification (Wallace,
"Frame of Reference", 132). This objection raises the problem that in the situ-
ations where there is an ontology with an unnamed object, it is possible that
there is a true sentence (∃x)(Px) but no single sentence Pa is true. However,
this problem is easily avoided if we do not let the substitutional quantifier
range over the terms of a language Lo, but rather over the terms of any finite
extension of Lo. This seems philosophically justified: if we encounter a situ-
ation in which we have unnamed objects, we can solve this situation simply
by naming the unnamed objects.1 (c), then, is also satisfied. This leaves us
with (d). As (a)-(c) have been shown to be fulfilled for each substitutional
language with its respective referential equivalent, it seems that the differ-
ence between the substitutional quantification and referential quantification
1Such an approach of defining the truth of quantifiers via an extension of language that
names every object is also taken by Shoenfield (18-19).
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lies entirely in how they deal with opaque contexts. Substitutional quantifi-
cation can happen into opaque contexts, while referential quantification over
objects cannot.
Is it possible to have a language with only referential quantifiers that can
quantify in and outside of opaque context, and thus has the same expres-
sive power as a language with a substitutional quantifier? We can create a
standard referential language with the standard referential quantifier ∃x that
ranges over objects, and add to that a second referential quantifier ∃′x that
ranges over terms of Lo. This language can quantify into transparent con-
texts using the standard ∃x quantifier, and into opaque contexts using the
∃′x quantifier.
This pair of referential quantifiers can function in the exact same way
as a substitutional quantifiers when it comes to quantifying with respect to
atomic sentences. However, when it comes to quantification with respect
to any sentence, it becomes more problematic. The referential quantifiers
can have the same outward effect by quantifying over either terms or objects
depending on whether the predicate in the atomic sentence says something
about the term or its non-syntactic denotation, this is not possible in the case
of conjunctions where one part of the conjunction says something about a
syntactic element and the other part about its denotation. For example, a
referential language with two quantifiers could make sense of, following a
previous example, the formula ‘John believes that he can see x’ where John be-
lieves he can see the Morning Star but does not believe that he can see the
Evening Star and ‘x is a planet’ by in the first instance quantifying over terms
and in the second instance over denotations of terms. This solution does not
work for the formula ‘x is a planet and John believes that he can see x’, as we
would either have to quantify over terms, in which case ‘x is a planet’ would
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be false, or we would have to quantify over non-syntactic objects, in which
case ‘John believes that he can see x’ would be problematic. Substitutional quan-
tification seems to avoid this problem.
This difference can be explained by how sentences using these quantifiers
are built up. A sentence using a referential quantifiers is built up from a sen-
tential function. Because of this, it is necessary to decide when a referential
quantifier is used whether the truth of the sentence is based on the syntax
of the term or the object denoted by the term. A substitutional quantifier,
on the other hand, is defined on the basis of other sentences. The deter-
mining whether the truth of this sentence is based on the syntax of the term
or the object denoted by it has already happened, namely during the truth
definition for the atomic language. Co-extensive terms are given the same
truth-values in cases where their denotation determines truth, but can have
different truth-values in case syntax determines truth. Because of this, the
substitutional quantifier can safely limit itself to ranging over terms.
This also clarifies the relation between P-Sat and satisfaction for languages
with an infinite amount of atomic languages. In the case where predicates
range over terms and say something about syntax, P-Sat and satisfaction de-
scribe the same relation, as seen in the previous chapter. If the predicates
range over objects, denotation is necessary and a definition has to be given
that uses satisfaction by objects to provide the truth-conditions of the atomic
sentences. Terms that co-designate are given the same truth-values, so P-Sat
and satisfaction coincide, despite the opaqueness of Q(x1, α). Any sentence
that is different from a true sentence only by the replacement of one term with
a co-designative one will still be true. It thus does not matter that satisfaction
cannot designate only one term where there are multiple that co-designate
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and instead designates the object, as the truth-conditions in these transpar-
ent cases will always coincide.
6.3 Conclusion
We have seen that there are four conditions necessary for the equality be-
tween a substitutional language and its referential equivalent, namely (a)
both quantifiers extend the ontology of the metalanguage with the same ob-
jects (b) all the terms are taken to denote (c) each of the objects added in
(a) has a term and (d) that no sentences are opaque. We have seen that (a)-
(c) are always met due to what it means to be a language. A language has
to be about something, so the terms must denote and the ontology must be
extended with these denotations. Furthermore, a language can always be
extended to include terms for yet-unnamed objects. The difference between
substitutional and referential quantification, then, lies in how they deal with
opaque context.
This difference can be explained by how the construction of sentences
with quantifiers takes place in referential and substitutional languages. In
a substitutional language, sentences are built up from other sentences. The
truth-definitions have already been given at the level of the atomic sentences,
and at this point it is decided whether a predicate says something about the
syntax of a term or about its denotation. Co-extensive terms have the same
truth-conditions for predicates that discuss the objects, but can have differ-
ent truth-conditions for predicates that deal with syntax. At this point, both
syntactical and ontological issues can be discussed purely through reference
to terms, because these terms will refer to themselves in syntactical contexts,
and to their normal denotation in ontological contexts. Because of this, in
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transparent context, it does not matter which one of a set of co-extensive
terms is picked, and because of this, quantification over terms suffices, as
these predicates had their truth-values determined on the basis of the denota-
tion of the term. In opaque contexts, quantification over terms also works, as
in these cases it is the terms themselves that determine the truth of a sentence-
part. In an important sense, substitutional quantification ranges over both
terms and their denotation, depending on how the predicate was defined in
the atomic language.
In referential languages, the sentences are built up from sentential func-
tions. The distinction between predicates that deal with syntax and predi-
cates that deal with objects has not yet been made, and because of this, it is
necessary to distinguish between quantification over syntax and quantifica-
tion over objects. As a result, quantification can either only go over terms or
only go over denotations, and because of this, a combination of transparent
and opaque contexts can lead to problems.
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Conclusion
This thesis has looked at the feasibility of a definition of truth that does not
make use of satisfaction. The first part of this thesis looked at the discus-
sion surrounding the covert use of satisfaction for the definition of truth of
a substitutional language. It did this by first of all presenting the arguments
put forth by Wallace as to why a substitutional language has to make use of
satisfaction. After this, it presented Kripke’s reply to Wallace, which argued
that a truth definition for a substitutional language did not need to make use
of satisfaction, as it is possible to recursively define truth on the basis of a
pre-determined truth definition for an atomic language Lo.
In the first part of the second half of this thesis, an overview was given
of the work of Tarski to gain more insight in the original motivation for the
use of satisfaction. This showed that rather than being given philosophical
importance, as Wallace argued, it was a tool to construct definitions of truth
for languages with an infinite amount of sentences. Satisfaction, for Tarski, is
not necessary for finite languages as we can simply list each partial definition
in turn.
The second part of the second half of this thesis showed that while Kripke
for a large class of substitutional languages gives a definition that does not
make use of satisfaction, namely those with an finite amount of atomic sen-
tences, substitutional languages with an infinite amount of atomic sentences
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do need to appeal to satisfaction. For these languages, satisfaction is neces-
sary to give an atomic truth definition, for much the same reasons that Tarski
uses satisfaction: we cannot give an enumerative definition for a language
of infinite size. From this we concluded that if there is a difference between
substitutional and referential quantification, it is not determined by their re-
spective use of satisfaction. Instead, the difference seems to be that a substi-
tutional definition of truth is built up out of simpler sentences, for which it is
already determined whether they refer to syntax or denotation, which leads
to a situation in which co-designative terms have the same truth-values in
transparent contexts but not necessarily in opaque contexts. This allows the
use of a single quantifier that ranges over terms yet still maintains the rela-
tion to its denotation. With a referential definition of truth, on the other hand,
sentences are built up out of sentential functions, and the choice whether the
sentence refers to syntax or denotation happens all at once for the entire sen-
tence. Because of this, a referential quantifier can only refer to objects or
only to terms, whereas a substitutional quantifier can refer to both objects
and terms. This can create problems in situations where a sentences includes
both transparent and opaque contexts.
As for the philosophical significance of satisfaction, this thesis has re-
vealed that there is remarkably little. The philosophical significance that was
given to satisfaction by Wallace, namely the importance of predicates and
the connection between sentences and the world, were in fact not a result of
the use of satisfaction, but rather essential qualities of language and truth.
To be a language, a sentence has to say something, and to say something,
the words of the language need to have meaning. Similarly, truth, follow-
ing Tarski, was taken to be a relation between what a sentence expresses and
what is the case. This holds equally in cases in which satisfaction cannot be
found. The question of satisfaction, then, is one of technical detail, and not
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of philosophical importance.
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